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Explaining Prolonged Silences in Transitional Justice: the 
disappeared in Cyprus and Spain 
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Abstract 
The article examines why some post-conflict societies defer the recovery of those who 
forcibly disappeared as a result of political violence, even after a fully-fledged 
democratic regime is consolidated. The prolonged silences in Cyprus and Spain 
contradict the experience of other countries such as Bosnia, Guatemala and South 
Africa, where truth recovery for disappeared/missing persons was a central element of 
the transition to peace and democracy. Exhumations of mass graves containing the 
victims from the two periods of violence in Cyprus (1963-1974) and the Spanish civil 
war (1936-1939) was delayed up until the early 2000s. Cyprus and Spain are well 
suited to explain both prolonged silences in transitional justice and the puzzling 
decision to become belated truth seekers. The article shows that in negotiated 
transitions, a subtle elite agreement links the non-instrumental use of the past with the 
imminent needs for political stability and nascent democratization. As time passes, 
selective silence becomes an entrenched feature of the political discourse and 
democratic institutions, acquiring a hegemonic status and prolonging the silencing of 
violence. 
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Introduction  
Although Federico García Lorca is a famous desaparecido (disappeared) of the 
Spanish civil war, he and approximately 30,000 ‘forgotten’ Republican victims are 
still lying in mass graves.
1
 Lorca’s fate epitomizes a central debate in contemporary 
Spanish society: should the country ‘unearth’ the truth about the civil war (and search 
for the bodies of the disappeared) or is it better to continue to ‘silence’ the divisive 
past? Spain is not the only Mediterranean country dealing with the past. During the 
two waves of violence in Cyprus, namely, the inter-communal violence (1963-1974) 
and the subsequent Turkish invasion (1974), approximately 2,000 Greek-Cypriots and 
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Turkish-Cypriots went missing. Disappearances were political acts deployed by both 
communities to cleanse the island of the presence of the ethnic ‘Other’ an effort to 
fulfil official political objectives. Until quite recently, there has been little effort to 
recover the bodies – or the truth.  
Since the 1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances and the ensuing 
demand by relatives to acknowledge the truth have shaped the development of 
transitional justice
2
 in societies emerging from conflict or authoritarianism. The 
unprecedented grassroots mobilization in several South American countries of the 
relatives of desaparecidos seeking the acknowledgment of truth resulted in the first 
official bodies mandated to establish an authoritative version of human rights abuses 
in the mid-1980s (Neier 1999:40). For example, the strenuous efforts of the ‘Madres 
de Plaza de Mayo’ in Argentina led to the establishment of CONADEP, a body much 
like a truth commission with specific emphasis on the desaparecidos; similar 
coordinated efforts by relatives culminated in truth commissions in Bolivia, Chile and 
Guatemala, to name only a few. Since then, truth commissions have become a central 
tool of transitional justice (Hayner 2002).  
Moreover, the persistent efforts of the relatives’ associations led to landmark 
legal decisions, gradually constructing an international normative context which 
reserves a central position for ‘truth’ and enforced disappearances. The most 
significant recent development is the 2006 International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Scovazzi and Citroni 2007).
 
The 
Convention is the first universal instrument of its kind and represents a breakthrough; 
it ascribes the inalienable right of the relatives of a missing persons to ‘know the 
truth’ (art. 24, par. 2)
 3
 regarding the fate of the disappeared and the conditions of their 
disappearance. Hence, although the right to truth is still emerging in international law 
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and is not explicitly stated in international treaties (Mallinder 2008:163), the crime of 
enforced disappearances creates specific rights to truth for victims’ relatives in several 
treaties.   
It is in this revised normative context that such concepts as transitional justice, 
reconciliation and truth recovery have become central components of the policy-
making agenda. Note, for example, the recent decisions by international 
organizations, most importantly the UN, to draw from a standard transitional justice 
toolbox in their peace-building initiatives (UN 2004). Given this, it is not surprising 
that a growing number of post-conflict countries choose human rights trials and other 
policies of accountability to comprehensively address the violent past, leading to a 
‘justice cascade’ (Lutz and Sikkink 2001). Even more interestingly, these normative 
pressures encourage societies to overturn prolonged silences, even several decades 
after transition, a phenomenon called post-transitional justice (Aguilar 2008; Collins 
2010). 
In the midst of this burgeoning change, Cyprus and Spain pose a complex 
dilemma. Contrary to the experience of other countries with disappeared/missing 
persons, such as Bosnia, Chile and Guatemala, where the mobilization of (civil) 
society to recover the missing persons was a central element of the transition to 
democracy, Cyprus and Spain remained (selectively) silent for a remarkably long 
period after their respective democratic governments were consolidated and are only 
now unearthing bodies and truths. Interestingly, although Latin American societies 
had limited access to legal and institutional tools, they mobilized earlier and more 
effectively to address the demand for truth than did Spain and Cyprus, even though 
the latter were members of influential international organisations. One would expect 
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societies with advanced legal instruments to be more proactive and effective in 
resolving human rights issues but this was not the case.  
Why do certain societies defer the acknowledgment of human rights problems 
even when democracy has been fully consolidated? How is this silence constructed, 
maintained and perpetuated? How (if at all) do transitional justice settlements persist 
over time? Finally, what explains the recent efforts of a growing number of countries 
like Spain and Cyprus to establish the truth and overturn prolonged silences, even 
several decades after the transition?  
It is argued that an early elite consensus, frequently informed by political 
learning from past experiences, links the non-instrumental use of the past with the 
political and security priorities of the nascent regime. Ultimately, this leads to strong 
institutionalization. As time passes, a ‘linkage trap’ is constructed, whereby selective 
silence becomes a well-entrenched and hegemonic feature of the political discourse 
and democratic institutions. Eventually, this hegemonic linkage narrows the variety of 
alternative policies and sidelines dissenting voices. Paradoxically, this linkage 
frequently provides the necessary tools for domestic truth seekers to acknowledge 
past human rights abuses, albeit in the long term.  
The article contributes to the growing (post)transitional justice debates, by 
highlighting the importance of domestic political actors in shaping or limiting external 
normative pressures. The decision of political elites to overturn prolonged silences is 
often informed by electoral, security symbolic and other domestic political 
considerations rather than driven by normative adaptation to external pressures. This 
is a gradual and often reversible process, influenced by the structure of domestic 
politics. The article also notes that the phenomenon of post-transitional justice is 
enhanced by unprecedented developments in forensic science. Uncontested forensic 
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evidence legitimizes previously excluded voices, thereby encouraging truth-seeking 
initiatives to mobilize, even belatedly.  
The article begins with a critical review of the literature of transitional justice, 
focusing on the absence of an analytically rigorous presentation of central working 
concepts. Drawing on the innovative tools of ‘elite framing’, it then explains the 
above-mentioned puzzles in Cyprus and Spain and sheds light on the causal 
mechanism through which silence over past humanitarian issues is constructed and 
perpetuated. It concludes with insights relevant to the study of (post)transitional 
justice.   
 
Enforced Disappearances and Truth Recovery in Transitional Justice 
Although the concept of truth recovery in transitional settings has gained currency 
over recent decades, it has been used to refer to a wide range of different – even 
contradictory – phenomena. It remains contested whether truth recovery constitutes a 
means to a higher end (i.e. reconciliation) or an end/value in itself. It is equally 
undetermined if truth refers to a process (i.e. truth-telling) or an outcome (i.e. report 
of a truth commission). Nor have scholars determined whether the scope of truth is 
individual (micro-truth) or social (macro-truth).  
In essence, the literature fails to address a number of ontological, 
epistemological and political problems. To get around this problem, this article adopts 
a bifurcated view of truth recovery. On the one hand, narrow truth recovery is used to 
refer to a minimalist conception of truth , more precisely, to forensic evidence related 
to the whereabouts of the disappeared/missing persons. Since the early 1990s forensic 
exhumations have become a conventional tool of international institutions in 
addressing the individual (narrow) demand for truth (Stover et al 2003:663-664). On 
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the other hand, wider truth recovery, indicates the official and unofficial efforts of 
societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian regimes to democratize the process 
of dealing with the past (Smyth 2007), by broadening the accessibility to the public 
discourse of previously excluded voices. These range from truth commissions, to 
tribunals, traditional justice, community-story-telling initiatives and official apologies. 
Needless to say, these conceptions of truth are not contradictory and frequently 
overlap.  
Based on the ‘Peace Accord Matrix’ of Kroc Institute, Table 1 identifies a 
number of countries as truth-seeking or non-truth seeking, relating this to the type of 
settlement reached – negotiated or non-negotiated. A careful examination of the table 
reveals the explanatory strengths and limitations of transitional justice literature. 
Three main groups of countries emerge from the table.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In the first group, shown in the bottom boxes, the absence of a comprehensive 
peace settlement, as in the case of Eritrea-Ethiopia, can explain the decision to abstain 
from addressing the past. Elsewhere the total victory (or collapse) of one of the 
parties in conflict, as in the Philippines, creates conducive conditions for the winning 
side to decide whether to address the past. Meanwhile, in places like Cambodia or 
Timor-Leste where international involvement constitutes a central feature of 
transition/peace-building initiatives, transition is followed by some form of (narrow or 
wide) official acknowledgment of the problem of disappearances, most significantly 
through the establishment of retributive models of accountability. The proactive 
involvement of international institutions includes the contribution of material 
resources, as well as logistic support to undertake exhumations or establish war 
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crimes tribunals and truth commissions (Sriram 2004:25; UN 2004) and reflects an 
entrenched commitment to the normative principles of transitional justice. A 
normative thread seems to be linking a growing number of scholars who insist that 
societies in transition who address human rights violations, such as enforced 
disappearances, are more likely to strengthen the rule of law, prevent recourse to self-
help justice, develop respect for human rights culture and educate citizenry in 
democratic practices (Elster 2004; Méndez 2001:32; Minow 2002). The growing use 
of the tool of human rights trials in most societies where international organizations 
are engaged in peace-building, bolsters the argument that the norm of accountability 
for grave human rights violations has created the ‘justice cascade’ mentioned above 
(Sikkink and Walling 2007; Lutz and Sikkink 2001). 
A second group, at the top left of the table, involves cases of negotiated 
transitions/peace settlements, where the transition was followed by some sort of 
acknowledgment of the problem of the disappeared.
4
 It seems that a significant 
number of countries have opted to acknowledge human rights abuses despite the 
fragility of the peace/democratization processes. In fact, certain landmark cases that 
have shaped contemporary debates on transitional justice, such as Argentina and 
Chile, could have been included in this box. It is revealing that all societies who 
experienced a pacted transition and decided to come to terms with their past – with 
the exception of Croatia – chose the establishment of a truth commission over 
measures of retributive justice. In essence, this column reaffirms the view of a 
growing number of scholars who include truth commissions as novel and superior 
tools in the transitional justice toolbox (Hayner 2002). Truth commissions have 
historically been seen as ‘second-best’ alternatives, located somewhere between the 
impossibility of retributive justice prohibited by the pacted nature of the transitions 
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and the growing demand for truth in societies with missing persons (Neier 1999:40). 
More recently, truth commissions have been transformed; their  functions include the 
ability to restore the dignity of victims, to uproot long-standing myths that bolster 
violence and cultures of victimhood (Rotberg 2000) and to break the cycles of 
violence (Minow 2002), thereby becoming a central instrument of transitional justice 
(Brahm 2007;Hirsch 2007).  
But that is not the whole story. One would expect that in the post-1989 period, 
when the tools (including binding legal instruments, the centrality of human rights on 
the international agenda and DNA testing) were available to recover the (narrow or 
wider) truth about missing persons, more societies in transition would have 
acknowledged the truth and provided societal closure. But as the third group, shown 
at the top right of the table reveals, more than half the countries who experienced a 
negotiated transition have resisted – for the time being – these external pressures. In 
fact, as the experiences of Mozambique and Northern Ireland indicate, they have 
primarily designed policies based on amnesties and silence. A number of realist 
scholars subscribing to the ‘logic of consequences’ (Snyder and Vinjamiri 2003) have 
long argued that because transitions/peace agreements are fragile processes, any effort 
to comprehensively address the past may upset ‘spoilers’ who perceive truth recovery 
initiatives to be blatant scapegoating and thus endanger the transition (Vinjamuri and 
Snyder 2004:225). In essence, these scholars insist that scrutinizing the past is not a 
normative decision but a political one and, as such, any measure that could contribute 
to the stability and consolidation of the regime could legitimately be used, even if this 
requires the adoption of amnesties, impunity, forgetting and silence (Cobban 2006; 
Mallinder 2008; Mendeloff 2004). 
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Spain and Cyprus are outlier cases and do not fit well into the table. Spain 
would have initially been included in the top right quadrant. During the transition to 
democracy (1975), Spanish society and political elites decided to establish a ‘pact of 
silence’ and literally and figuratively bury these complex issues. Still, in a remarkable 
volte face, 70 years after the conclusion of the civil war and almost 30 years after the 
consolidation of democracy, Spain started digging into its past (Aguilar 2008), 
moving it to the top left box. For its part, Cyprus is the only case where despite the 
absence of a political settlement of the conflict, a successful mechanism has been 
established to address the demand for (narrow) truth recovery of Turkish-Cypriot and 
Greek-Cypriot missing. It therefore makes sense to use these two societies to 
comprehensively test the central arguments of transitional justice literature.  
With the exception of Northern Ireland, the literature of transitional justice has 
focused on ‘success stories’ (i.e. where truth recovery is central in the transition) such 
as South Africa, the former Yugoslavia and Guatemala (Thoms et al 2008). Little 
notice has been taken of cases where the truth recovery for missing persons and 
transitional justice has been absent, such as Cyprus and Spain. Moreover, by focusing 
explicitly on the period of transition, or immediately following it, the literature has 
failed to notice that although societies during transition may decide to defer the 
solution of human rights issues this does not necessarily mean that a demand to 
acknowledge this will not emerge in the future.  
Furthermore, the transition in Spain and the cessation of hostilities in Cyprus 
took place well before the above mentioned normative turn in the 1990s. Rather, they 
occurred at a time when foreign intervention for human rights was minimal, thereby 
making these two countries instructive examples on how societies can manage 
humanitarian problems in the absence of the ‘international factor’. Finally, the time-
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lag permits us to draw safer conclusions, test alternative hypotheses and examine 
causal patterns of silence/non-silence over human rights abuses, than if we use more 
recent cases. For all these reasons, Cyprus and Spain are well suited to explain both 
prolonged silences in transitional justice and the decision to become belated truth 
seekers.  
 
Political learning, negotiated transitions and silences 
In societies emerging from conflict, the guidelines for what will be remembered and 
what will be excluded from public discourse are drawn up during the transitional 
period. Therefore, the study of transitions provides useful insights into the 
(non)solution of human rights problems and the long term effects of transitions. As 
Diagram 1 indicates below, elite consensus is significantly facilitated – often dictated 
- by transitions that result from a pact between the major political forces. In cases of 
pacted transitions, there is a need to set a least common ideological denominator upon 
which to build the consensus for the new political regime.  
[Diagram 1 here] 
A decision to silence contentious incidents of the past, such as the Spanish 
Civil War, or to ‘selectively remember’ the past in a way that accentuates a culture of 
victimhood, as in Cyprus, is frequently identified as the most appropriate basis for 
consensus in transitions to democracy. More than politics is at stake here. The 
burgeoning field of ‘memory studies’ has shown that a common feature of post-
traumatic societies is the conscious decision to forget certain painful aspects of the 
past (Brewer 2010:147;Connerton 2008:60). In a notable case-study commonly used 
in transitional justice literature, post-World War II (West) Germany’s transition in the 
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1950s is characterized by the social amnesia of Germans – forgetting what they did 
and also what was done to them (Misztal 2005:1327).   
A subtle agreement is frequently reached between parties previously in 
conflict to ‘link’ the non-use of the bitter past to the political arena in exchange for a 
commitment to the new democratic political regime. Since negotiated transitions are 
perceived to be second-best alternatives for all parties, contentious issues like truth 
recovery are often excluded; public debate raises the issue of responsibilities and 
might easily become a ‘blame game’, endangering the whole agreement. For example, 
in Northern Ireland, the IRA remains sceptical of opening a formal truth recovery 
process on the issue of the disappeared, as this would raise the thorny issue of 
responsibilities (Guelke 2007:285). In this way, silence or selective memories become 
ingrained in political discourse. As noted, eventually, the elite framing becomes 
institutionalized and hegemonic; this may be the most effective path to peace, stability 
and democratic consolidation, but it decreases the prospect and scope of truth 
recovery. 
The process of consensus-building described here is often facilitated, even 
dictated, by the painful experiences of the past which act as political lessons at crucial 
historical junctures, such as transitions.
 5
 According to Bermeo, ‘crises often force 
people to re-evaluate the ideas that they have used as guides to action in the past. The 
changed ideas may relate to tactics, parties, allies, enemies, or institutions’ 
(1992:274). As Bermeo sees it, a lesson can be learned by considering similar 
experiences of other countries in the international arena (horizontal lesson) or 
considering a similar preceding period in a society’s history (vertical lesson) (ibid).  
Elite settlements, although providing a conducive environment for promoting 
democracy and peace, not to mention the ideal environment for resolving urgent 
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problems (economy, reconstruction, institution-building), are achieved at the expense 
of the quality of the emerging democracy. Negotiated transitions tend to concentrate 
power in the hands of a few political elites and inhibit open democratic procedures; 
they restrain the development of a vibrant civil society and slow the development of 
political and civil rights (Encarnación 2003; Licklider 1995:685; Linz and Stepan 
1996:56).  
The most significant side-effect of ‘pacted transitions’ is the demobilization of 
civil society. Main sources of truth-seeking in post-conflict/post-authoritarian regimes 
are vocal civil society groups associated with the victims; in negotiated transitions, 
like Cyprus and Spain, these remained silent.  As noted above, in both Cyprus and 
Spain an early elite consensus to link the non-instrumental use of the past with the 
need for political stability led to the creation of a hegemonic discourse. Once a frame 
becomes hegemonic, inconvenient questions that contravene or challenge it are 
excluded from public debate. As Ian Lustick says, hegemonic discourses ‘exclude 
outcomes, options or questions from public consideration’ (1993:121). This does not 
mean that frames are permanent or immutable: new legal, scientific, economic or 
political developments may force elites to slightly revise their proffered frame to 
sustain its hegemonic role and prevent its crumbling. However, if the intensity and 
significance of the new developments outshine the ability of frame-makers to 
incorporate them smoothly in the existent frame, then the hegemonic frame loses its 
explanatory value and collapses.  
 
Methodology 
Elite framing is a useful tool to study the policy outcomes that prevent truth recovery. 
The framing process has two analytical components. The first stems from the need to 
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identify the source(s) of the problematic situation and attribute responsibility: this 
could be termed ‘legitimizing framing’ (Benford and Snow 2000). It presumes that 
the present situation is unjust, and grievances are due to the actions of another agent 
or conditions outside the control of the ‘in-group’ (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 
1997). The second, ‘motivational framing’, derives from the need to change the 
problematic situation; it leads to the creation of a strategy to accomplish change 
(Benford and Snow 2000). 
Framing ‘select[s] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[s] them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations’ 
(Entman 1993:52). The primary function of frames is to ‘organize experience and 
guide action’ (Snow et al 1986:464); thus, a core element of the framing process is the 
degree of instrumentalization in the definition of an issue. The framing process 
determines ‘reality’ because of its ability to highlight certain aspects of reality while 
ignoring others (Benford and Snow 2000). As Entman aptly notes, ‘The frame 
determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a 
problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it’ (1993:54). Because 
policy-makers and ordinary people deploy these simplified mental images to interpret 
social events and choose among alternative courses of action (Tetlock 1998:876), 
framing is a useful tool for analyzing certain aspects of a conflict, in this case, truth 
recovery for missing persons.
6
  
In this article, I employ an innovative, multi-method approach to ‘elite 
framing’ (Benford and Snow 2000), drawing on an extensive and comprehensive 
study of parliamentary speeches in two countries over the last three decades. This 
analysis is coupled with process tracing to identify the causal mechanism by which 
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the specific elite framing adopted during transition prevented the scope of truth 
recovery in Cyprus and Spain (George and Bennett 2005:215). In the wide-ranging 
archival work that preceded the analysis, I read parliamentary debates, seeking to 
trace the construction of elite discourse(s). I also had limited access to classified 
documents from the Cyprus House of Representatives and memos prepared for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, I examined party 
documents, such as electoral programmes and party memoranda. All these helped me 
to determine the development of the political discourse. The interviews I conducted 
with politicians shed light on why certain policies were chosen over others at specific 
junctures; and my interviews with individuals with privileged information allowed me 
to ‘triangulate’ my hypotheses.  
The study of parliamentary debates has several advantages. For one thing, it 
allows the analyst to pinpoint a certain framing which is adopted at a very specific 
time; actors cannot retrospectively change their positions to suit temporal changes in 
context (Loizides 2009). For another, it facilitates process-tracing, or the construction 
and maintenance of elite discourse over the long-term.  
 
Spain: Disappeared and El pacto de silencio 
What becomes apparent from the Spanish parliamentary debates
7
 is that the issue of 
the desaparecidos was not raised until the early 2000s.
8
 This prolonged silence poses 
a methodological problem in the elaboration of the elite framing. To overcome it, I 
pursue two complementary paths. First, I analyze the debates on other victims’ 
groups: those mutilated in the civil war, the widows and children of the fallen and ex-
prisoners. I consider the difference between the treatment of their demands and the 
silence over the issue of desaparecidos and relate this to elite framing. Second, I 
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examine the debates on the Amnesty Law (1977), generally perceived to be the 
founding tenet of the transition. The two sets of analyses, coupled with my interviews 
of members of the designated parliamentary commission and my study of electoral 
programs overcome this methodological concern.  
The debate on the Amnesty Law of 1977 is revelatory of ‘legitimizing 
framing’. In it, the civil war is presented as a period of ‘collective madness’ where 
both sides committed heinous crimes. The attribution of responsibility is strictly 
avoided: clearly, there is no ‘rational’ actor to blame for the immense tragedy 
(Aguilar 2002). An example of this diagnostic framing appears in the words of the 
spokesperson of the governing party, Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD); in a 1978 
reference to the debated law on pensions for widows and orphans, Bravo de Laguna 
Bermudez says: 
[T]hose widows and orphans that today we talk about….are not merely 
widows or orphans of the communists, of the socialists, or anarchists, but 
widows and orphans of the tragic Spain … We can give different explanations 
about what happened between 1936 and 1939, but in any case, it was a 
national tragedy. (Parliamentary Debates Num.141, 23/11/78:5576-8) 
He goes on to proffer strategies to alter the situation (‘motivational framing’). In 
effect, two central framing strategies link the silence on humanitarian issues with the 
legitimacy of the transition: the establishment of a wide political consensus to bury 
the divisive past and achieve reconciliation – seen as a precondition for democratic 
consolidation; and the adoption of an instrumental rationale for redressing victims 
groups’ (material) needs for closure.  
 The element of learning from past experiences is evident in the speeches on 
the Amnesty Law and the Draft Law. The former Law is framed as the symbolic 
16 
 
closure of a prolonged period of divisions and the beginning of a new democratic era. 
During its debate, a representative of the Socialist Party insisted: ‘Today is the date, in 
which finally, the civil war is buried’ (Parliamentary Debates Num.24, 14/10/77:965-
8). Throughout the Parliamentary records, the need to bury the past is seen as the 
distilled experience of painful lessons, even by the representatives of the ‘defeated’, 
most notably communist leader Santiago Carillo (Parliamentary Debates Num.5, 
27/7/77:73-76). In the interviews I conducted with members of the Designated 
Parliamentary Committee for drafting the Law on Historical Memory, in 2004, almost 
all still subscribed to this prognostic framing, saying that an agreement to bury the 
past was mandatory at the time (Anonymous Interviews, 6 May 2009 and 18 May 
2009).  
The other tenet of motivational framing highlights the instrumental rationale 
of accommodating the victims groups’ demands. More specifically, reparations are 
granted to certain groups not as an acknowledgment of their suffering or their 
contribution to a noble cause but to comfort the disaffected, including reparations to 
widows and orphans (Parliamentary Debates Num.141, 23/11/78:5575-6) and military 
pensions (Royal Decree 6/1978). In part, these are acts of benevolence – not justice. 
They are perceived as solving problems not covered by the Amnesty Law; therefore, 
they are treated as solutions that will enable closure (punto final) and accelerate the 
processes of national reconciliation and democratic consolidation (Aguilar 2008:420).  
Still, desaparecidos are excluded from this framing. Oddly enough, at 
approximately the same time as the amnesty debates, unofficial exhumations were 
carried out in Spain. My archival research shows that from 1977 and throughout this 
first step towards democracy, exhumations took place around the country. In fact, a 
popular magazine of the time, Interviú,
9
 featured detailed coverage of the efforts of 
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the relatives of desaparecidos to exhume the graves and provide their loved ones with 
a decent burial (Interviú 21/12/1978; 3/01/1980). Although in other transitional places 
(Latin America), these grassroots processes have led to strong social movements, in 
Spain, they lost momentum and succumbed to the overriding hegemonic discourse.  
Why was the issue of desaparecidos silenced when the demands of other 
victims groups were accommodated? I have two overlapping responses, the first 
focusing on the top echelons and the second on the grassroots, both related to the side-
effects of the specific elite framing. 
First, political exhumations (‘narrow truth’) or policies of acknowledgment 
(‘wider truth’) for the desaparecidos and the political violence would have raised 
questions of political responsibility. Asking and answering the question ‘who did 
what to whom?’ had the potential to derail democratic consolidation. Therefore, any 
truth-seeking initiative was out of the question because it contradicted the raison 
d’être of the proffered framing, namely, to abstain from using the past as a political 
argument in debates.  
A second overlapping explanation considers the meagre participation of 
Spaniards in civic associations, a phenomenon described by Omar Encarnación as 
‘civic anemia’ (2001:63). More than 20 years after the consolidation of democracy, 
only one in three Spaniards belongs to any voluntary association, levels similar to the 
post-communist regimes of Eastern Europe (ibid). For one thing, the legacy of the 
(pacted) transition led to the demobilization of the civil society, thereby hindering 
truth-seeking. For another, an endemic feature of Spanish political culture is the 
penetration/control of all sorts of civic associations by political parties, primarily 
through financial means (Encarnación 2003). To some extent, political parties have 
determined the agenda of the associations and defined their scope. As the early elite 
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framing became institutionalized and ‘hegemonic’, it narrowed the conception of 
national interest at the top and silenced grassroots practices that could contravene it. 
An indication of the hegemonic status of the discourse is its institutionalization in 
legislation and legal decisions. Ryan says that in 1979, an individual involved in an 
unofficial exhumation was reprimanded for carrying out ‘illegal exhumations’ (Ryan 
2009:123). The legal institutionalization of this hegemonic belief is even obvious in 
the contemporary wave of exhumations. In a recent motion, Judge Baltázar Garzón 
argued that the systematic nature of the crime constitutes a crime against humanity, 
and therefore the 1977 Amnesty Law is inapplicable to cases of enforced 
disappearances (Motion 399/2006). The possibility of overturning the founding tenet 
of the transition, namely, the Amnesty Law, sparked heated political debate and 
opened up the prospect of Garzón’s expulsion. 
The case of Garzón can be fully understood only within the wider post-
transitional justice context in Spain (Aguilar 2008). More precisely, since the early 
2000s, several grassroots organizations of relatives have mobilized to unearth their 
desaparecido ancestors, provide them with a decent burial, clear their reputation and 
acknowledge the corresponding (republican or democratic) version of truth about the 
Spanish civil war (Gálvez-Biesca 2006; Ferrándiz 2009).
 10
 The mobilization of the 
generation of the grandchildren of the disappeared exerted bottom-up pressure on the 
Socialist government, leading to the passage of the above-mentioned Law on 
Historical Memory which addressed central issues of transitional justice: denouncing 
Franco’s regime; banning public symbols that commemorate Franco or his allies; 
mandating local governments to finance exhumations of mass graves; declaring 
‘illegitimate’ the summary military trials held during the civil war and Francoist 
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dictatorship; opening up military archives; and offering other measures of moral, 
symbolic and economic repair to all victims of the war (Law 53/2007). 
 In other words, more than three decades after the consolidation of democracy 
in Spain, a specific framing was ingrained in political institutions, the political system 
and legislation. Simply stated, its hegemonic status prevented truth recovery. 
Surprisingly, however, the prolonged silence was finally broken. Proof of this is the 
passage of the Law on Historical Memory and its fuelling of media and public 
debates. 
 
Cyprus: selective memory and missing frames  
Tracing the elite framing of the problem in the RoC over the past decades reveals a 
number of downplayed or silenced issues. Take, for example, the official definition of 
the missing. Until 2003, a missing person was considered to be a ‘Greek-Cypriot who 
is still missing since the July 20th 1974, due to the Turkish invasion…and the state 
has no positive information that s/he died’ (Law Number 77/1979). Two interesting 
features of motivational framing are evident in this definition. First, the beginning of 
the problem of missing persons coincides with the Turkish invasion (20/7/1974), 
thereby indicating a conscious decision to causally link the issue of the missing with 
the invasion. Since 1974, 12 resolutions by the House of Representatives have 
assigned sole responsibility to Turkey; all were adopted unanimously (Resolutions 
Number 37/1975; N.46/1978; N.58/1980; N.113/1992;N.124/1997). Second, the 
Turkish-Cypriots who went missing as a result of the atrocities of Greek-Cypriot 
paramilitaries in the 1960s (Patrick 1976) are excluded, even though they are citizens 
of the Republic.  
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In other words, selective memory (or selective oblivion) became a founding 
tenet of the pact that facilitated the transition to peace and democracy in the RoC after 
the 1974 invasion. References to cases of missing persons, either Greek-Cypriots or 
Turkish-Cypriots preceding the Turkish invasion, would have seriously delegitimized 
the predominant discourse which identifies the Turkish invasion as the cause of the 
problem.  
Motivational framing can explain the tactics of political elites in the 
addressing of the problem of the missing. They used two overlapping framing 
strategies: one emphasizing national unity and reconciliation by strengthening the 
institutions of the Republic as the only way to overcome the legacy of intra-
communal division of the past within the Greek-Cypriot community and restore 
credibility to the RoC; the other using the symbol of wounds opened by the Turkish 
invasion to accentuate a ‘culture of victimhood’ and enable the construction of a new 
common basis of ‘unity’ for the Greek-Cypriot community.  
Although the Turkish invasion is used as the focal point of the framing, it was 
preceded by growing intra-communal violence within the Greek-Cypriot community 
culminating in a short coup ousting President Makarios.
11
 Leftists, frequently treated 
as traitors, were the targets of violent attacks during the anti-colonial struggle of 
EOKA  (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών - National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters);
12
 these peaked during the coup (Papadakis 1993). A number of civil society 
initiatives representing the relatives of those killed have recently emerged demanding 
that the state apologize for the human rights violations of leftists (Ireton and Kovras 
2011). The legacy of intra-communal violence was so traumatic that it continues to 
create political cleavages within the Greek-Cypriot community.  Nevertheless, in the 
overall ‘Cyprus problem’, even left-wing parties who suffered from nationalist 
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violence have subscribed to the frame prioritizing ‘national unity’. For example, on 
the first anniversary of the coup, when the memories of the intra-communal violence 
were still fresh, the leader of communist party AKEL officially declared that his party 
would ‘keep the flag of patriotic unity high’ (Parliamentary Debates 15/7/1975: 581). 
The Cypriot Communist party echoed PCE’s conciliatory tone in Spain, mentioning 
the need for concessions (‘silences’) to pave the way for democracy. 
The Turkish invasion led to a revised framing, one focusing on unity and the 
traumas of the invasion. The missing became the central symbol of ongoing suffering, 
and political elites invested political capital in this framing. The official name of the 
designated parliamentary committee on missing persons (established in 1981), the 
Committee on Refugees-Enclaved-Missing and Adversely Affected Persons 
(discussed in greater detail below), underscores this political strategy. By linking all 
aspects of victimhood triggered by the Turkish invasion, it was expected to frame the 
problem in human rights terms, thereby enhancing international sympathy for the 
Greek-Cypriot negotiating position in the search for a political settlement to reunify 
the island.  
As might be expected, the elite framing, in combination with the (de facto) 
division of the island in Cyprus facilitated the creation of a ‘highly censorious 
environment’, one ‘marked by taboos, intolerance and vilification of views deviating 
from the predominant governmental discourse and the official views of history’ 
(Faustman 2009:34). As in Spain, this culture has fettered the development of a 
vibrant and vocal civil society (Mavratsas 2003) which, as noted above, is a source of 
truth-seeking. Even the official organization of the relatives of the missing has 
interpreted human rights through the lens of national interests. In other countries with 
disappeared or missing persons, such organizations are the main sources of truth 
22 
 
seeking; but in the Greek-Cypriot community, they blocked truth recovery (Kovras 
and Loizides 2011). For example, in the mid-1990s, the relatives’ association objected 
to the government’s intention to exhume common graves in two Greek-Cypriot 
cemeteries on the grounds that this would lead to a ‘cover-up’ of the problem (ibid). 
Despite the absence of a political settlement, in 2004 a bi-communal 
agreement was reached to resume the activities of the hitherto ineffective Committee 
on Missing Persons (CMP). ‘De-linking’ humanitarian issues like the missing – where 
the Republic of Cyprus had a moral advantage – was previously considered likely to 
weaken the overarching Greek-Cypriot political strategy for the reunification of the 
island. However, lessons learned from past policy failures by chief policy-makers, 
technological advancements that supported a revised policy and the domestication of 
new (legal and human rights) norms,
13
 all contributed to the resumption of the CMP. 
It has now become the most successful bi-communal project on the island (UN 2007). 
By August 2010, 690 bodies had been exhumed and 248 identified (CMP 2010). 
In addition, although the elite framing retained its founding tenets, it became 
less rigid and began to acknowledge the victimization of Turkish-Cypriots. 
Paradoxically, a dual framing process has facilitated the exhumations and the demand 
for (narrow) truth recovery. On the one hand, although the wave of exhumations is 
seen to reaffirm the dominant discourse of victimhood – i.e. every exhumation is an 
evidence of the Turkish aggression – there is strong incentive to encourage the 
effective working of the CMP. At the same time, the slightly revised framing that 
encompasses the Turkish-Cypriot missing, has led to institutional measures that 
introduce the (relatives of the) Turkish-Cypriot missing as legitimate political actors. 
This development has transformed the normative context within which domestic 
actors interact, leading to the support of the CMP even by actors or politicians who 
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previously had reservations. Despite the remaining political stalemate, the 
developments on the missing have instilled in the public and political discourse 
critical re-evaluation over responsibilities for the past – an element previously 
‘missing’.  
 
Lessons for (post)transitional justice 
The study finds that an early elite consensus and its institutionalized discourse is a 
double-edged sword in negotiated transitions. On the one hand, the deep 
institutionalization of the consensus excludes dissenting voices and prevents early 
truth recovery. On the other hand, it may be a necessary evil to achieve a minimum 
level of democratic consolidation and peace. Labelling this a ‘linkage trap’, I note that 
in negotiated transitions, a subtle elite agreement links the non-instrumental use of the 
past with the imminent needs for political stability and nascent democratization. 
Gradually, this silence is ingrained in the political institutions and the political 
culture; ultimately, this framing acquires a hegemonic status that is hard to challenge. 
But in the long term, this silence may be a necessary precondition for democratic 
consolidation. Alternatively put, there is an inherent paradox in consensual 
institutions: they are oriented towards reproducing the consensus (hegemonic belief) 
which silences the victims and civil society at large, but at the same time, they 
cultivate democratic institutions which provide the tools necessary for domestic truth 
seekers (such as civil society groups) to promote truth recovery and (post)transitional 
justice, albeit, in the long term.  
Given this logic of consequences, political parties representing or affiliated 
with victims’ groups frequently hesitate to deal with the past, even if they assume 
power in the nascent democratic regime. The cases of PSOE and AKEL, in Spain and 
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Cyprus respectively are not exceptional. The consecutive Socialist governments 
(1981-1989 and 1993-2004) in Greece, while representing a significant number of 
those defeated in the Greek civil war have abstained from addressing the past. The 
same applies to Chile. In the aftermath of the 1989 referendum that ousted Pinochet, 
the centre-left Concertación coalition governed for four terms but made only marginal 
moves towards official acknowledgment of the past (Sandbu 2010). Political parties 
representing the defeated or past victims may prefer to disappoint their electoral 
constituents rather than trigger instability and endanger overarching objectives (i.e. 
democratic consolidation, economic development or reconstruction of state 
infrastructures).  
 However, this is just one part of the story, since at different post-transition 
periods, these same parties may decide to break the silence and campaign in the 
interests of victims groups. For example, during his Presidency in Argentina (2003-
2007), Néstor Kirchner introduced measures calling for greater scrutiny of the past, 
most notably by declaring the ‘full-stop’ and ‘due obedience’ laws as null and void, as 
well as reopening trials for human rights abuses – including disappearances 
(Economist 2003). Similarly, in Uruguay, despite two referendums that rejected the 
annulment of the amnesties for human rights abuses during the military from 1973 to 
1985, President Vázquez campaigned to abolish the amnesty law, arguing that it 
violated Uruguay’s obligations under international human rights treaties (Economist 
2010a).  
Hence, silence is not an irreversible feature of national politics and collective 
memories. In fact, there is a growing trend in post-traumatic societies to revise the 
pacts of silence, even after a considerable delay, which reflects the broader normative 
turn in international politics. In the period preceding the end of the Cold War the 
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overarching priorities of maintaining global order and stability made amnesties and 
silence over human rights abuses constitutive elements of peace agreements (Newman 
et al. 2009). Since then, though, the global diffusion of human rights norms (Risse and 
Sikkink 1999) has increasingly dictated the inclusion of human rights provisions into 
peace settlements. As Christine Bell’s systematic study of more than 600 peace 
agreements since 1990 has shown, the emerging normative consensus perceives 
amnesties as an exception to the norm of accountability (2008:243). New normative 
requirements on the content of peace settlements are explained by the proactive role 
of the most influential international institutions in combination with the emergence of 
vocal transnational advocacy networks which exert pressure for their implementation 
(ibid). In essence, these external normative pressures have rendered blanket amnesties 
obsolete, changing the nature and the content of elite bargaining in peace processes 
and democratic transitions (Lutz and Sikkink 2001). The growing deployment of 
normative tools to address the past in peace agreements is also evident by the decision 
of an increasing number of countries undergoing negotiated transitions to deal with 
their violent past, a phenomenon reflected in increased number of truth commissions 
(Hirsch 2007).  
This revised normative framework not only informs the content of pact-
making, but, as the experience of several South American societies has indicated, it 
legitimizes domestic truth-seeking actors to exert bottom-up pressure in a way that  
overturns enduring amnesty laws and challenges decades’ long silences (Collins 
2010). In other words, the agenda of international politics (and law) has considerably 
changed since the historical examples of Cyprus and Spain. The new norms prevent 
silence from being institutionalized and bring an end to oblivion and denial in 
societies with well-entrenched cultures of silence. In the period preceding the 
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normative turn of 1990s, it would have been unimaginable for any Spanish 
government to pass a law that would address several (post)transitional justice 
measures or challenge the legitimacy of the Amnesty Law of 1977 – perceived as the 
founding tenet of the post-Francoist Spanish democracy.  
The landmark memory law in Spain should not be attributed exclusively to 
external influences. It also resulted from the sustained efforts of a number of 
grassroots groups who had been trying since the early 2000s to unearth the bodies of 
the desaparecidos of the civil war. These efforts were ultimately embraced by 
influential domestic allies, including political parties, judicial authorities and media, 
and resulted in officially implemented measures of (post)transitional justice 
(Ferrándiz 2009). Similarly in Cyprus, the resumption of the CMP was preceded by 
the strenuous efforts of bureaucrats within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who 
perceived the external influences as an opportunity to implement a policy of (narrow) 
truth recovery. However, this policy has not led (yet) to the crumbling of the 
hegemonic silence – only its substantial revision. 
The experiences of Cyprus and Spain reveal that the role of domestic actors is 
crucial in taking advantage of (or resisting) external influences; even when a decision 
to overturn silence is made, this is not a linear or predetermined process, but gradual 
progress with many pauses and backward steps. Brazil verifies this; 25 years after the 
end of the dictatorship, the proposal of the popular President Lula to establish a truth 
commission on the disappeared triggered a fierce reaction from the military and was 
subsequently withdrawn (Economist 2010b). This is a central feature of other post-
transitional justice societies, such as Chile and El Salvador (Collins 2010).  
External opportunities depend on domestic politics and vice versa. This point 
echoes Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ theory: international pressure ‘expands domestic 
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win-sets’, and as such constitutes a necessary condition for a policy shift, but ‘without 
domestic resonance’ this is insufficient (1988:430). The decision of political elites to 
revise a well-entrenched framing is often shaped by electoral, security, symbolic and 
other political considerations, rather than explained exclusively by normative 
adaptation. Drawing on the same theoretical framework, Martin and Sikkink have 
highlighted the importance of domestic constituencies in filtering external pressures in 
several Latin American countries (1993). Although the study acknowledges the power 
of external normative pressures in bringing about post-transitional justice and the 
erosion of prolonged silences, it also highlights the pivotal role of domestic politics in 
utilizing or resisting these normative influences, a point frequently disregarded by the 
prescriptive orientation of the literature. Most importantly, the study fits in with a 
broader trend towards bridging the gap between the international and comparative 
politics (Caporaso 1997); it shows how international norms have come to revise the 
nature of pact-making, while highlighting the importance of domestic actors and 
institutions. 
Another issue raised by the comparative analysis of Cyprus and Spain relates 
to the nature of truth in transitional settings. Even the most celebrated venues for 
screening the past, such as truth commissions or trials, analyze/incorporate individual 
‘truths’ through a kaleidoscopic view of the past which seeks to establish a new 
mental framework to make sense of complex and confusing past events  (Wilson 
2003:370). Frequently, the mandates of truth commissions delimit the scope of 
enquiry, either by focusing exclusively on the study of specific human rights 
violations or by considering a very specific period of violence (Chapman and Ball 
2001:4). For example, some transitional states have mandated truth-finding 
mechanisms to investigate only disappearances, excluding other crimes, such as 
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torture, arbitrary detention or sexual abuses of women, as the cases of Argentina and 
Uruguay reveal (ibid). In this way, truth-seeking initiatives contribute to a narrative 
construction which privileges certain memories, victims’ groups or political parties at 
the expense of others. Trials and truth commissions frequently exclude, obscure or 
marginalize other accounts that contravene this overarching framework. Therefore, it 
is important to highlight that while truth seekers challenge hegemony, they also 
construct a new one, and this new hegemony may be full of blind spots. 
In Cyprus and Spain, the advancement of forensic sciences has made an 
important contribution to truth discovery. On the one hand, forensic evidence 
establishes hard facts about the past violence that legitimizes previously excluded 
voices. On the other hand, forensic evidence from exhumations creates more 
(discursive) space for multiple – but equally legitimate -- truths to enter public 
debates. The ability to unearth the (narrow) truth about the past in a scientifically 
sound way paved the way for the acknowledgment of the suffering of the Turkish-
Cypriot missing. Forensic truth coupled with the global normative context encourages 
the emergence of multiple versions of truth about the past. This enhances the 
prospects of (narrow or wider) truth recovery in post-conflict settings and suggests the 
need for overturning prolonged silences.  
 
Conclusion 
In negotiated transitions, a subtle elite agreement linking the non-instrumental use of 
the past with the political and security priorities of the transitional society is often 
achieved. As time passes, a ‘linkage trap’ is constructed, where selective silence over 
the past becomes a well-entrenched feature of the political discourse and democratic 
institutions. As soon as this framing becomes hegemonic, dissenting voices are 
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silenced; it also narrows the conception of national interest and inhibits the solution of 
human rights issues, even when new windows of opportunity open. At first glance, we 
conclude that this situation leads to a deadlock. However, as the hypothesis of 
‘linkage paradox’ shows, in the long term, the linkage of (i.e. the silence on) human 
rights issues to the elite pact that serves as the founding tenet of  transition becomes 
the most efficient way to unearth the truth. More precisely, this silence enables the 
consolidation of strong democratic institutions which, in turn, provide the institutional 
tools to (domestic) truth-seekers to put forward a comprehensive truth recovery, when 
such a societal demand emerges. 
A policy of reviewing the past cannot be implemented without societal 
consensus that this is a priority. The fascinating transformation of an inoperative 
humanitarian body for more than two decades into the most successful bi-communal 
project in Cyprus, and the vocal demand of the generation of the grandchildren of the 
desaparecidos, in Spain to unearth the remains of their grandparents 70 years after the 
conclusion of the civil war reflect the emergence of a new societal consensus. In both 
countries, domestic actors challenged the long-standing hegemonic silence, 
reaffirming the growing phenomenon of post-transitional justice in international 
politics and reflecting the new normative turn seen round the globe.
14
  
 
Bibliography 
Aguilar Paloma (2008) ‘Transitional or Post-Transitional Justice? Recent 
Developments in the Spanish Case’, South European Society and Politics, 
vol.13(4), pp. 417-433. 
Aguilar Paloma (2002) Memory and Amnesia. The Role of the Spanish Civil War in 
the Transition to Democracy, London: Berghahn Books.  
Bell Christine (2008) On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and Lex Pacificatoria, 
Oxford:Oxford University Press 
Benford, Robert & Snow, David (2000) ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: 
An Overview and Assessment,’ Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611-39 
Bermeo, Nancy (1992) ‘Democracy and the Lessons from Dictatorship’, Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 24(3), pp. 273-291 
30 
 
Brahm Eric (2007), ‘Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Successes 
and Impact’, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 8, pp.16-35. 
Brewer John (2010) Peace Processes. A Sociological Approach, London:Polity. 
Caporaso A. James (1997) Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and 
International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol41(4),pp.593-592 
Chapman Audrey and Ball Patrick (2001) ‘The Truth of Truth Commissions: 
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa and Guatemala’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol.23(1), pp. 1-43 
Cobban Helena (2006) ‘International Courts’, Foreign Policy, No.153, March-April, 
pp.22-28. 
Collins Cath (2010) Post-Transitional Justice. Human Rights Trials in Chile and El 
Salvador, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
CMP, Committee on Missing Persons (2010) Fact Sheet, August 2010, Also available 
at: http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1 
Connerton Paul (2008) ‘Seven Ways of Forgetting’, Memory Studies, Vol1(1), pp.1-
59. 
Economist (2003) ‘A Full Stop Removed’, 368(8340):33 
Economist (2010a) ‘Human Rights in Uruguay: Take three’, 24 November. 
Economist (2010b) ‘Don’t Look Back: The Army Blocks a Truth Commission’, 
January 7. 
Elster Jon (2004) Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Encaranción Omar (2001) ‘Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in 
Spain’, Political Science Quarterly, vol.116(1), pp. 53-79. 
Encarnación Omar (2003) ‘The legacy of Transitions: Pact-making and democratic 
consolidation in Spain’, Estudio/Working Paper 2003/193, also available at: 
www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/publicaciones/working/archivos/2003_193.pdf 
Entman, Robert (1993) ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,’ 
Journal of Communication 43(4): 51-58 
Faustman Hubert (2009) ‘Aspects of Political Culture in Cyprus’, in Ker-Lindsay and 
Faustman Hubert (eds), The government and politics of Cyprus. Peter Lang, 
Oxford pp. 17-44. 
Ferrándiz Francisco (2009) ‘Fosas Comunes, Paisajes del Terror’, Revista de 
Dialectologia y Tradiciones Populares, vol. LXIV, no.1, pp.61-94. 
Gálvez-Biesca Sergio (2006) ‘El Proceso de la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica 
en España: Una aproximación a los movimientos sociales por la memoria’, 
International Journal of Iberian Studies, vol.19(1), pp. 25-51. 
Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
George L. Alexander and Bennett Andrew (2005) Case Studies and theory-
Development in Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
Guelke Adrian (2007) ‘The Northern Ireland Peace Process and the War Against 
Terrorism: Conflicting Conceptions?’, Government and Opposition, Vol.42(5), 
pp.272-291. 
Hayner Priscilla (2002) Unspeakable Truths. Facing the Challenges of Truth 
Commissions, London, Routledge 
Hirsch Ben-Josef Michal (2007) ‘Agents of Truth and Justice. Truth Commissions 
and the Transitional Justice Epistemic Community’, David Chandler and Volker 
Heins (eds.) Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy. Pitfalls, Possibilities and 
Paradoxes, pp. 184-205, London: Routledge. 
31 
 
Interviú, (1978) ‘Navarra: Fusilados por Dios y por España’, 21 December 1978, 
issue 136 
Interviú (1978) ‘Navarra: Fusilados por Dios y por España’, 21 December 1978, issue 
136; Interviú, ‘17 Pueblos recuperan 211 cadáveres. Legionarios fusilados por 
falangistas 3 January 1980, issue 190; Interviú, NAVARRA 1936 (2) Los 
verdugos de la Cruzada’ 
Interviú, (1980) ‘17 Pueblos recuperan 211 cadáveres. Legionarios fusilados por 
falangistas 3 January 1980, issue 190; Interviú, NAVARRA 1936 (2) Los 
verdugos de la Cruzada’ 
Ireton Kathleen and Kovras Iosif (2011) ‘Non-apologies in Post-Conflict Settings:the 
Case of Post-Colonial Cyprus’, Time and Society (forthcoming) 
Klandermans, Bert (1997) The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford: Blackwell 
Kovras Iosif and Loizides Neophytos (2011) ‘Delaying Truth Recovery for Missing 
Persons’, Nations and Nationalism, (forthcoming). 
Licklider, Roy (1995) ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars: 
1945-1993’, The American Political Science Review, Vol.89 (3), pp. 681-690. 
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred (1996) Problems of democratic Transition and 
Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe, Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press. 
Loizides G. Neophytos (2009) ‘Elite Framing and Conflict Transformation in 
Turkey’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.62(2), pp. 278-297.  
Lustick, Ian (1993) Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France 
and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Lutz Ellen and Sikkink Kathryn (2001) ‘The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and 
Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, Vol.2(1), pp.1-34. 
Mallinder Louise Maria (2008) Amnesty, Human Rights, and Political Transitions: 
Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Martin Lisa and Sikkink Kathryn (1993) ‘U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina 
and Guatemala, 1973-1980’," in Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics, edited by Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, 
and Robert Putnam, Berkeley:University of California Press, pp:330-362. 
Mavratsas, Caesar (2003) Εθνική Οµοψυχία και Πολιτική Οµοφωνία. Η ατροφία της 
Ελληνοκυπριακής κοινωνίας των πολιτων στις απαρχες του 21
ου
 αιώνα. 
Athens:Katarti.  
Mendeloff David (2004) ‘Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding: Curbing the Enthusiasm?’. International Studies Review, 
Vol.6, pp. 355-380. 
Méndez E. Juan (2001) ‘National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the 
International Criminal Court’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 15(1), pp. 
25-44. 
Minow Martha (2002) ‘Breaking the Cycles of Hatred’, In Minow Martha (ed.) 
Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law and Repair, pp. 16-75, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
Misztal Barbara (2005) ‘Memory and Democracy’, American Behavioral Scientist, 
Vol.48(10), pp.1320-1338. 
Neier Aryeh (1999) ‘Rethinking Truth, Justice, and Guilt after Bosnia and Rwanda’, 
in Carla Hesse and Robert Post (eds.), Human Rights in Political Transitions: 
Gettysburg to Bosnia , pp.39-51, New York, NY: Zone. 
32 
 
Newman Edward, Paris Roland and Richmond Oliver (2009) ‘Introduction’, in New 
Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, Newman Edward, Roland Paris and 
Richmond Oliver (eds), United Nations University Press, pp.3-25. 
Papadakis, Yiannis (1993) ‘The Politics of Memory and Forgetting’, Journal of 
Mediterranean Studies, Vol3(1), pp.139-154 
Putnam Robert (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games’, International Organization, Vol.42(3), pp.427-460. 
Risse Thomas and Sikkink Kathryn (1999) ‘The Socialization of International Human 
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Risse Thomas, Ropp 
Steven and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.1-38. 
Rotberg Robert (2000) ‘Tryth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation’, in Truth V. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions. Edited 
by Rotberg I. Robert and Thompson Dennis, pp. 3-21, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
Ryan Lorraine (2009) ‘For Whom the Dominant Bell Tolls: The Suppression and Re-
emergence of Republican Memory and Identity in Spain’, in Laura Rorato 
and Anna Saunders (eds.) The Essence and the Margin. National Identities 
and Collective Memories in Contemporary European Culture, Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, pp.119-134.   
Sandbu Martin (2010) ‘Chile Six Months since the Earthquake’, Financial Times, 28 
August 2010. 
Sant Cassia, Paul (2005) Bodies of Evidence. Burial, Memory and the Recovery of 
Missing Persons in Cyprus. Oxford, Berghahn Books (Paperback Edition). 
Sikkink Kathryn and Walling Carrie Booth (2007) ‘The Impact of Human Rights 
Trials in Latin America’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.44(4), pp.427-445. 
Scovazzi Tullio and Citroni Gabriela (2007) The Struggle Against Enforced 
disappearance and the 2007 UN Convention, Leiden:Martinus Nihoff 
Publishers 
Snyder Jack and Vinjamuri Leslie (2003) ‘Trials and Errors. Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice’. International Security, Vol. 
28(3), pp. 5-44. 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha (2004) Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs. 
Peace in Times of Transition. New York, NY: Frank Cass. 
Stover Eric, Haglund William and Margaret Samuels (2003) ‘Exhumation of Mass 
Graves in Iraq Considerations for Forensic Investigations, Humanitarian 
Needs, and the Demands of Justice’, JAMA, 2003;290(5):663-666 
Tetlock Philip E, (1998) ‘Social Psychology and World Politics’ in Daniel .T. Gilbert, 
Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Linzey, Eds., The Handbook of Social 
Psychology, 4th ed, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
Thoms Oskar, Ron Jamer and Paris Ronald (2008), ‘The Effects of Transitional 
Justice Mechanisms’, Center for International Policy Studies, Working Paper, 
April 2008 
UNFICYP (2007), ‘The UN in Cyprus. An Inter-Communal Survey of Public Opinion 
by UNFICYP’, also available at: 
http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1324 
United Nations (2004) ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies’, UN Security Council, S/2004/616/23 August 2004 
33 
 
Wilson Richard Ashby (2003) ‘Anthropological Studies on National Reconciliation 
Processes’, Anthropological Theory, Vol. 3(3), pp. 367-387. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Type of transition/settlement and truth recovery for disappeared/missing 
persons
1
 
 
       
Sources: Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute  (http://peaceaccords.org), last accessed 2 April 2011) 
the Physical Integrity Rights Cingarelli and Richards Human Rights Data Set 
(http://ciri.binghamton.edu/) and the annual ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’ of the US 
State Department. The first date in parentheses refers to the transition/peace agreement, the second to 
the implementation of the official truth seeking mechanism. 
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Diagram 1: Schematic presentation of the construction and maintenance of 
(hegemonic) silence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 The estimated number of remains still lying in unmarked mass graves ranges from 30,000 to 100,000 
(Ferrándiz 2009) 
2
 This has been defined as ‘the array of processes designed to address systematic or widespread human 
rights violations committed during periods of state repression or armed conflict, where human rights 
violations are defined as extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment’ (Olsen, Payne & Reiter 2010:805).  
3
 ‘Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced 
disappearance, the progress and the results of the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person’. 
4
 Assisted by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), Croatia has established a 
mechanism to exhume, identify and return the disappeared to their relatives.  
5
 Peter Hall provides an interesting definition of learning: ‘a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or 
techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when 
policy changes as the result of such a process’ (Hall 1993:278). 
6
 It should be mentioned that framing is not an epiphenomenon. It is not merely a reflection of reality, 
but a simplification of a ‘perceived reality’ (Loizides 2009). In essence, framing is the deliberate effort 
of different social actors to produce, guide and maintain meaning, and, as such, it is important to 
examine how specific political problems are framed (Benford and Snow 2000:613). By examining the 
framing strategies of different actors, we can establish cause and effect relationships.  
7
 This includes research on the parliamentary debates, questions and laws related to the issue of 
desaparecidos in the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados (Lower House); interviews with members of 
the designated inter-ministerial commission that prepared the law on the Recovery of Historical 
Memory in 2007; and analysis of the electoral programmes of the major nation-wide political parties 
since the first democratic elections after transition in 1977. 
8
 Although there are scattered references in the 1970s and 1980s, there are only marginal provisions for 
the reparations of relatives.  
9
 I am grateful to Professor Santos Juliá for bringing this source of information to my attention. 
10
 Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory. 
11
 15 July 1974. 
12
 The most important Cypriot anti-colonial armed group active in the 1955-1959 period. 
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13
 The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the fourth Interstate application of Cyprus v. 
Turkey (27581/94), 10 May 2001, constituted a landmark decision that influenced the policies of both 
Turkey and the RoC.  
 
 
 
 
 
